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Economic Evaluation of Cropshare and Cash Lease Contracts in 
South Dakota and Nebraska1 
Dr. Larry Janssen, Dr. John Cole, Ms. Xuan Xu, and Dr. Bruce Johnson 2 
Abstract 
Factors influencing choice of share or cash rental leases for cropland are examined using a 
1996 dataset containing 1071 lease contracts in Nebraska and in South Dakota. Logistic 
regression results indicate tenant's age, capital position, and relationship with landlord were 
more important than leased land use or crop management variables. 
Introduction 
Agricultural land rental markets are an important component of the organization of 
production in the Northern Plains. The leasing of farmland has changed from the full tenant 
of the past to the part-owner operator of today. In 1997, part owners operated 60 percent of 
all farms and 71 percent of all farmland in the United States. Leasing is no longer viewed by 
many as a step towards full ownership but rather an effective way to gain control of land 
resources. Leasing of crop, hay, and pasture land is being used by agricultural producers as a 
management tool to expand or contract their operation, conserve limited capital, finance farm 
operations, increase management flexibility, and reduce risk. An estimated 44 percent of the 
total land in farms in Nebraska and 39 percent of the land in farms in South Dakota is leased. 
These percentages are consistent for the states bordering Nebraska and South Dakota, with 
the rate of land in farms leased varying from 35 to 55 percent (1997 Census of Agriculture) . 
1 Selected paper presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the Western Agricultural Economics Association, 
held jointly with the American Agricultural Economics Association, Long Beach, CA. July 28-31 , 2002. 
2 Dr. Janssen is Professor of Economics, South Dakota State University (SDSU), Brookings, SD; Dr. Cole is 
Assistant Professor of Agribusiness, Southwest State University, Marshall, MN; Xuan Xu received her Master 
of Science degree in Economics from SDSU; Dr. Bruce Johnson is Professor of Agricultural Economics, 
University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE. Funding for this research is from the Agricultural Experiment Stations of 
Nebraska and South Dakota. 
Study Purpose, Data, and Methods 
In this study, we examine economic characteristics of cropland lease arrangements in 
South Dakota and Nebraska and revisit the issue of contract choice between cropshare and 
cash leases in both states. Allen and Lueck (1992) developed a logit model to examine the 
contract choice of cash rent versus cropshare leases. Their model was applied to data from a 
1986 survey of farmland leasing contracts in South Dakota and Nebraska. We plan to re-
estimate and extend their econometric model of leasing contract choice using a more recent 
( 1996) data set of cropland leasing arrangements in both states. 
A major pilot study of agricultural land leasing markets in 1986 was completed by 
the University of Nebraska - Lincoln and South Dakota State University. This effort 
included a mail survey of both farm operators and non-operators landlords involved in land 
rental agreements in Nebraska and South Dakota (Johnson et. al., 1988). 
South Dakota and Nebraska were selected for these studies in part because both states 
are located in the Northern Plains transition region characterized by wide variations in 
agricultural and climatic conditions and thus in cropland leasing practices. The dominant 
types of agriculture from east to west in these states are: 1) western Combelt agriculture 
characterized by non-irrigated com, soybean, and small grain enterprises and may include 
hog, dairy, or beef cattle enterprises, 2) transitional (semiarid) agriculture characterized by 
irrigated and some non-irrigated com, soybeans, wheat, oats, and other small grains, and 
3) Great Plains agriculture characterized by beef cattle, sheep, and wheat farms and ranches 
and some irrigated specialty crops. These agricultural settings developed in response to 
climatic differences and were also influenced by land settlement patterns, urban/regional 
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trade center sizes, and other socio-economic/demographic patterns that influence farmland 
values, rental arrangements, and institutions (Johnson et. al., 1988). 
In order to establish a new comprehensive benchmark of agricultural land leasing 
data, a total of 5,800 farmers in South Dakota and Nebraska received the 1996 Cropland 
Leasing Survey. Stratified random sampling procedures were used to select the sample of 
farm operators in different regions of both states. The data set was constructed from the mail 
survey questions on cropland leasing arrangements completed by 1343 farm operators in 
1996. Key sections of the 1996 and 1986 leasing surveys can be directly compared. The 
1996 survey contains more questions about management practices in each type of leasing 
agreement, while the 1986 survey included responses from farmers and non-operator 
landlords leasing farmland. 
Cropland Rental Market Characteristics 
Farm operators in South Dakota and Nebraska leasing cropland typically operate 
small to medium size farms ofless than 2000 acres with less than $500,000 gross farm sales. 
Three-fifths of South Dakota and 72 percent of Nebraska cropland renters rely on net farm 
income for the majority of their household income (Table 1). 
Most agricultural producers operate owned and leased land. A majority of leased 
cropland acres in both states are in cropshare leases. The majority of tenants reported 
participation in at least one crop share lease also reported participation in at least one cash 
lease, with 39 percent ofrenters in both states involved in both types of leases (Table 1 ). 
Farmland renters in South Dakota and Nebraska average more than three farmland 
leases (Table 1). Nearly 65 percent ofrenters have leases with two or more landowners with 
the majority of rented cropland leased by tenants from three or more landlords. Contact 
3 
between tenant and landowner is fairly frequent. Most tenants reported having four or more 
management contacts per year with their landlords (Cole, 2000). 
Most rental agreements for cropland were reported as leases from unrelated 
individuals or relatives. Approximately one-half of rented farmland acres are leased from 
unrelated individuals, three-eighths are leased from parents or other relatives, and one-eighth 
of rented farmland acres are leased from government, tribal, or corporate entities (Cole, 
2000; Xu, 2002). The incidence of leasing farmland by type of landlord is shown in Table 2. 
One-half ofrespondents lease some cropland from local unrelated individuals, while more 
than one-third lease some land from parents and/or from other relatives. 
Individually, most cropland leases are oral, annual leases. Cash leases are more likely 
to be written, multi-year leases in Nebraska and oral, annual leases in South Dakota. Most 
individual lease agreements between tenant and landowner have been in effect for extended 
periods(> 10 years). Most tenants were very satisfied or generally satisfied with their 
cropland leases. Satisfaction levels were reported higher with crop share leases than with 
cash leases, yet there is a trend toward more cash leasing (Table 3). 
The majority of cropland leased in South Dakota and Nebraska are in crop share 
leases, while most rented pasture are in cash leases. The 60-40 or 50-50 tenant-landlord share 
lease is prevalent for non-irrigated cropland leases in eastern Nebraska and southeastern 
South Dakota and are dominant for irrigated cropland leases. The 2/3 - 1/3 share lease is 
dominant for non-irrigated crops in most of South Dakota and in western Nebraska. The 
incidence and extent of sharing input costs varies systematically by output share for non-
irrigated and irrigated crop leases. Almost all irrigated and most non-irrigated crop 
shareleases have cost sharing for one or more variable inputs. The number of shared inputs 
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increases as the landlord's share of output increases from 1/3 to 215 to Yz. For shared inputs, 
almost all cropshare leases have these input costs shared in the same proportion as the share 
of crop output (Cole, 2000; Xu, 2002). 
Contract Choice of Cash and Cropshare Leases - Revisited 
Considerable economic literature exists on the rationale for various contractual 
arrangements in agriculture including land leasing. More detailed literature reviews of land 
leasing articles were included in recent theses completed by Cole (2000) and Xu (2002) and a 
recent RAE review article on evolution of land leasing models by Dasgupta et.al. (1999). In 
this paper, we revisit the issue of contract choice of cash rent vs. cropshare leasing as 
developed by Allen and Leuck (1992) using 1986 data from landowners and tenants leasing 
cropland in Nebraska and South Dakota (Johnson, et.al. 1988, Janssen and Peterson, 1988) 
The basic approach is to examine the conceptual model and actual variables reported 
in the Allen and Leuck (AIL) study and re-estimate the coefficients for the same variables 
using the more recent 1996 dataset of cropland leases in South Dakota and Nebraska. Next, 
we extend their basic model by adding possible explanatory variables that were not available 
in the 1986 dataset or not included in their empirical model. 
Allen and Leuck assume the relevant choice is to lease cropland, instead of owner 
cultivation, and the important choice is between a cash rent and cropshare contract. The two 
main inputs are farmland supplied by landowners and farm capital (both human and physical) 
owned by farmer-renters and both parties are risk-neutral. A lease contract is not selected 
unless both parties expect to benefit (joint wealth-maximization). Actual crop output amount 
and quality level is subject to random fluctuation and considerable uncertainty, which implies 
the landowner cannot effectively monitor the input levels applied by observing output. 
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Cropshare contracts have less total input distortion than a cash lease, but incur costs 
associated with accurate division of the output and from both parties marketing their share of 
the crop output. Cash leases are fixed payments per acre and the farmer receives the entire 
crop output. According to A/L, in annual cash leases the farmer-renter supplies the optimal 
amounts of farm capital inputs but has possible incentives to overuse the land input by 
intensive cropping practices that deplete soil moisture, reduce soil fertility, increase erosion 
rates, etc. Thus the contract choice problem is the trade-off between output-division costs and 
input-distortion costs within a framework of joint wealth maximization (Allen and Leuck, 
1992, pp. 403). 
In general, share leases are preferred when the "costs" of dividing the crop output are 
relatively low and the potential to exploit the land resource (soil erosion, moisture, fertility 
etc) is relatively high. Cash leases are more likely when the costs of output division (and 
monitoring quality levels) are high and when the potential costs of exploiting the land 
resource are relatively low. 
The type and extent of relationships between landlord and renter can also be included 
in leasing contract choice models if it is assumed that relationships can alter costs of contract 
monitoring and compliance. It is important to note that farm lease decisions are made within 
a legal framework of common law, state statutes, and various Federal policies. 
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Model Specification and Variable Selection 
The logistic regression procedure is used to estimate the likelihood of a cropshare 
contract compared to a cash lease. Logistic regression analysis often used to investigate the 
relationship between the response probability and the explanatory variables (Allison, 1999) 
The response, Y, is a binary (0, 1) variable representing the cropland lease decision. Let X 
denote a vector of explanatory variables and p = pr(Y=l /X) is the response probability to be 
modeled. The linear logistic regression model has the form logit (p) =log (pl (1-p)) =a+ 
b'X, where pis the probability of selecting a specific lease (share lease in this study), 'a' is 
the intercept parameter, and 'b' is the vector of slope parameters. 
The dependent (response) variable, CONTRACT, is the cropland lease choice 
decision with a value of 1 for a crop share lease and 0 for a cash lease. The explanatory 
variables include land use, management practices, and location attributes on the cropland 
tract leased; farm business and demographic characteristics; and relationships between renter 
and landlord. The list of variable names, definition, and simple statistics from the 1996 
dataset are shown in Table 4. The variables in bold script are those included in the contract 
choice model reported by Allen and Lueck (1992) using the 1986 dataset. 
Tract size (ACRES) and land uses of the leased tract are some key explanatory 
variables. Irrigation is an important method of crop production ,especially in Nebraska, and is 
capital and management intensive. Irrigated crop yields are much higher and relatively more 
stable than non-irrigated cropland yields in the same locality. Allen and Lueck suggested that 
irrigated tracts are more likely to be cash leased as irrigation reduces the need to conserve 
soil moisture. Two alternative specifications for irrigated leased tracts are used in alternative 
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models, incidence of irrigated cropland (IRRIGATE) or percent of leased tract acres in 
irrigated crop production (IRRPCT), and the predicted signs are negative. 
Some leased cropland tracts are also used for hay production that requires minimal 
tillage (except for establishment). Also since hay output and quality levels are more difficult 
to measure at harvest and transport I storage costs as a percent of value are relatively high, 
cropland tracts with hay production are more likely to be cash leased. Again two alternative 
specifications for hay land use are used, incidence of hay (HAY) on leased tracts or percent 
of leased tract acres in hay production (HA YPCT), and the predicted signs are negative. 
Some leased cropland tracts also have pasture, especially in the central and western 
regions of both states. Most pasture tracts are cash leased, due in part to the high costs of 
monitoring and sharing livestock performance gains, and mixed cropland - pasture tracts are 
more likely to be cash leased. Alternative explanatory variables are incidence of leased 
cropland tracts with pasture (PASTURE) or percent of leased acres used for pasture 
(RNGPCT) and that predicted signs are negative. The amount of pastureland per leased 
cropland tract is only available in the more recent (1996) dataset. 
Selection of cropping pattern over time is an important management decision for 
renters and/or landowners. Com and alfalfa hay have been and continue to be the major 
irrigated crops in both states, while increasing com and soybean acres are replacing less 
profitable small grains (wheat, oats, rye, and barley) in crop rotations in the Northern Plains. 
Thus, incidence of rowcrop only (ROWC) cropping patterns are increasing in both states. 
Allen and Leuck suggested that leased tracts with only rowcrops are more likely to be share 
leased, as tillage levels increase and potential for soil erosion or moisture loss is higher. 
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Interaction terms for various land use combinations are included as control variables 
(ROW CHAY, ROWCPAST, and HA YPAST) in selected models . The variable ROW CHAY 
was the only interaction term used in the 1986 AIL study as pasture data were not available. 
Farmers lease cropland from various types of landlords and long-term relationships 
between renter and landlord are common (see data in tables 2 and 3). Leasing cropland from 
parents or other relatives often involves more interaction and knowledge about the situation 
of each party than leases from other individuals or institutions. Cropland leases between 
family members or relatives (FAMILY) should more likely be share leases, compared to 
greater incidence of cash leases from nonlocal (ABSENT) individuals unrelated to the renter. 
Farmers may also lease land from corporations or from federal, state, tribal, or local 
governmental entities (INSTITUTION). In most cases, the agents for these formal landlords 
are more likely to want the certain return of a cash lease and less likely to monitor tenant 
performance and accept the uncertain returns from a share lease. 
AGE , CAPITAL, and F ARMINC are included in all models. Allen and Leuck 
(1992) suggested increasing AGE is negatively related to cropshare leasing following the 
idea of the "agricultural ladder." Farmers facing a greater capital constraint would more 
likely participate in a share lease where input cost sharing occurs and output is divided after 
harvest, instead of partial or full cash payment before harvest in a cash lease. Farmers 
owning a greater share of their land operation, CAPITAL, usually have a lower capital 
constraint and would more likely engage in a cash lease, thus implying a negative coefficient 
for CAPITAL. Greater dependence on net farm income for family living expenses implies a 
positive coefficient for F ARMINC and greater tendency for share leasing, if tenant risk 
aversion is present. However, risk-averse landlords would be expected to prefer a cash lease. 
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DENSITY was included as a proxy for extent of urbanization and development 
potential for farmland in the county of the leased tract. The predicted sign is negative as 
potential land use shifts favor cash lease rates that are above returns from a share lease. 
Conservation management, PRACTICE, and tillage practices, TILLAGE, on the 
leased tract were not included in the earlier study as data were not available. Allen and Lueck 
(1992) suggest "cropshare is more likely to be chosen when tillage becomes more important 
because the potential for land exploitation is greater" (pp. 410). We include conservation 
management practices and index of soil loss from tillage practices on the leased tract as 
possible measures, but have no apriori expectations on coefficient sign. 
Two additional variables, STATE and ORAL, were not included in the earlier study. 
STATE is a control variable used to reflect different regional outcomes in cash or share 
leasing not captured by land use, farm operator, and lease specific variables. Cash leases are 
more likely to be written and may include specific cropland management control provisions. 
Share leases often imply some landlord involvement in management decision-making and 
flexibility in renegotiating resource use during a growing season as crop conditions change. 
An oral cropshare lease provides greater flexibility if tenant and landlord remain in contact 
with each other. Thus we predict a positive coefficient for the ORAL variable. 
Empirical Results 
The dataset used to empirically estimate the model coefficients are from 1182 
cropland lease agreements in Nebraska and South Dakota. Due to missing values for various 
explanatory variables, only 1071 cropland leases are included in the empirical models shown 
in Table 5. The data for 1071 cropland leases were obtained from 760 respondents to the 
1996 cropland leasing survey conducted in both states. A logistic regression program (PROC 
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LOGISTIC in SAS/STAT, Version 8) was used to estimate the coefficients of the cropland 
leasing models. Maximum likelihood procedures were used in all models. Full model I 
contain the 1996 results for the variables used in the farmer-sample of the 1986 dataset 
reported by Allen and Lueck. Stepwise model I is a stepwise version (backward elimination) 
of Full Model I with a 0.15 probability level cutoff for exiting variables. Stepwise model II 
was estimated from an alternative full model specified by the authors that include all 
variables considered in model I plus added variables discussed earlier. Stepwise model III is 
an alternative version where land use percentage variables are substituted for land use 
incidence variables in models I and II. 
In both versions of model I, coefficients are significant (p<0.01) for the variables 
HAY, ROWCHAY, FAMILY, AGE, and CAPITAL while the coefficient for 
INSTITUTION is statistically significant at p<0.07. The negative coefficients for HAY, 
INSTITUTION, and CAPITAL were expected and are related to greater incidence of cash 
leasing. The positive coefficient for FAMILY indicates share leasing is more likely to occur 
when the tenant is renting land from parents or other relatives. The positive coefficient for 
AGE indicates that older renters are more likely to share lease cropland than younger renters, 
contrary to the "agricultural ladder" hypothesis, but in accord with the trend to more cash 
leasing which is more likely to impact younger, perhaps less established, farmers. Also 
respondent AGE is highly correlated with the number of years the specific tract has been 
leased which is closely related to the incidence of share leasing (see table 3). 
The coefficients for IRRIGATE, ROWC, ACRES, DENSITY, and for FARMINC 
were not significant as p>0.25 in all cases. The signs of these coefficients were the same as 
apriori predictions (compare Tables 4 and 5). 
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In comparing model I results to A/L model results for the farmer-sample in the 1986 
dataset, it is important to note that the 1996 dataset has a considerably lower proportion of 
cropshare leases (0.54 vs . 0.653), higher proportion ofrowcrop only incidence (0.796 vs. 
0.662), and higher age of farmer than reported in the 1986 dataset. The coefficients for 
IRRIGATE, ROW, and INSTITUTION were statistically significant (p<0.05) in the earlier 
dataset while coefficients for HAY, FAMILY, and AGE were not significant. The actual and 
predicted signs of the coefficients were the same except for AGE, which also had a positive 
sign in the earlier dataset (Allen and Lueck, 1992, pp. 411-415). 
Results from models II and III, which includes additional explanatory variables, 
indicate that coefficients for hay and/or pasture land use and for individual tenant-landlord 
relationships (FAMILY and ABSENT) were statistically significant, mostly at the p<0.01 
level and had the predicted signs. However, the coefficient for INSTITUTION retained a 
negative sign but was not significant in the expanded models II and III. The positive sign for 
the AGE coefficient and negative sign for CAPITAL were highly significant in all models. 
The coefficients for ORAL and STATE were positive and highly significant in both model II 
and III indicating that oral lease and cropland leases in Nebraska were more likely to be 
cropshare leases, than written leases or cropland leases in South Dakota. 
Coefficients for irrigation, rowcrop, contract acres, and population density were not 
statistically significant in any logistic regression model examined using the 1996 dataset. 
Also coefficients for conservation management and tillage practice variables were 
insignificant indicating little if any relationship to incidence of cropshare or cash leasing. 
The C index of rank correlation, which assumes a value between 0 and 1, is used for 
assessing the predictive ability of a model. The closer the C index value is to 1.0 the better 
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the predictive ability. Model I (full and stepwise) have C-index values of 0.598, while the 
stepwise models II and III have C-index values of 0.683 and 0.685 respectively. Based on the 
chi-square tests for covariates in all models, the combined effect for all explanatory variables 
are significantly different from zero with a p-value of <0.001 . 
Selected Implications 
Traditional thought suggests share leases are preferred if the tenant is young and 
climbing the tenure ladder or if land exploitation is a consideration. Results from this study 
reject this and indicate that older producers are more likely to be involved in a share lease. 
This may reflect the longer-term nature of successful landowner/tenant relationships some of 
which may be between family members or successful farm producers shift some of the risk 
of crop production to the landowner to help insure survivability. Regardless, it is likely share 
leases will remain a viable option into the future. 
Results from this study reject the hypotheses that lease preference is related to 
conservation or tillage practices needed or even required on the tract. Leases for cropland 
tend to be relatively long term relationships of at least ten years allowing tenants to capture 
benefits from long-term improvements to the tract regardless if the cost was shared initially. 
Combined, this suggests that tenant's stewardship of leased and owned land is the same 
regardless of ownership or lease type. 
Crop-related uses were not important explanatory variables, while hay and pasture 
variables indicate mixed land use tracts tend to be cash leased instead of primarily share 
leasing cropland and cash leasing the hay or pasture. 
Finally, if most traditional factors are not influencing selection of lease type, then 
social factors such as local customs, values, and beliefs should be included in future models 
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examining lease preference. The relatively low concordant scores (C-index of 0.599 to 
0.685) suggests further improvements can be made in modeling leasing decisions. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Farm Operator Respondents, Nebraska and South Dakota, 
1996 
Characteristic 
Acres Operated: 
50-499 
500-999 
1000-1999 
2000 or more 
Ag Land Operated: 
Owned 
Leased 
Leased Cropland Acres In: 
Share Lease 
Cash Lease 
Avg. Number of: 
Leases 
Landlords 
Crop Lease Type: 
Cash only 
Share only 
Both Share & Cash 
Gross Farm Sales ($1000): 
Less than 100 
100-249 
250-499 
500 or more 
Operator Age: 
20-44 
45-64 
65 or more 
Nebraska South Dakota 
percent of respondents 
42 37 
29 24 
17 21 
13 18 
percent of acres operated 
53 57 
47 43 
percent of leased 
cropland acres 
62 55 
38 45 
average number per renter 
3.5 3.2 
3.2 2.8 
percent of respondents 
22 36 
39 25 
39 39 
percent of respondents 
56 59 
27 
11 
9 
31 
45 
24 
28 
9 
4 
30 
42 
28 
Net Farm Income to Household Income: 
Less than 30% 18 
30-49% 10 
50-79% 20 
80% or more 52 
23 
16 
22 
39 
Source: 1996 Cropland Leasing Survey, Nebraska and South Dakota 
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Table 2. Percent of Respondents Leasing Land by Type of Landlord 
Type of landlord: 
Relatives 
Parents or in-laws 
Other relatives 
Unrelated Individuals 
Local 
Non-local Instate 
Non-local Out-of-State 
Institution 
Government/Tribal 
Corporation 
Nebraska South Dakota 
percent ofrespondents 
leasing some land from 
44 32 
35 28 
50 
26 
21 
8 
8 
49 
16 
28 
7 
3 
Source: 1996 Cropland Leasing Survey, South Dakota and Nebraska 
Table 3. Characteristics of Cropshare and Cash Leases, Nebraska and South Dakota 
Lease Characteristics Cropshare Lease Cash Lease 
NE SD NE SD 
Size (avg. acres) 271 265 285 350 
Length (avg. years) 14.9 13 .7 11.3 11.7 
The lease is: percent of respondents per lease type 
Oral 66 81 40 57 
Written 34 19 60 43 
Annual 59 67 55 63 
Multi year 41 33 45 37 
Satisfaction with Lease percent of respondents 
Very or Somewhat Dissatisfied 6 4 11 12 
Generally Satisfied 46 55 55 54 
Very Satisfied 48 41 34 34 
Change in Past Five (5) Years percent of respondents reporting changes 
Landownership 10 10 10 12 
Cropshare to Cash n.a. n.a. 12 12 
Cash Lease Rate n.a. n.a. 44 47 
Cash to Cropshare 0 1 n .a. n.a. 
Change in the Inputs Shared 0 4 n.a. n.a. 
Source: 1996 Cropland Leasing survey, Nebraska and South Dakota 
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Table 4. Variable Name, Definitions, Simple Statistics, and Predicted Sign in Logistic 
Regression Models: Cropshare vs. Cash Rent 
Dependent Standard 
Variable Definition Mean Deviation Sign 
Y=Contract y = 1 if cropshare lease, = 0 if cash lease 0.532 0.499 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Acres Number of acres in contract (lease) 249.5 274.2 ? 
Irri2ate 1 if irrigated crop acres are in lease, 0 otherwise 0.332 0.471 -
Hay 1 if hay acres are in lease, 0 otherwise 0.188 0.391 -
Pasture 1 if pasture acres are in lease, 0 otherwise 0.213 0.410 -
Rowe 1 if row crops are only crop acres (com, soybean, 0.796 0.403 + 
sunflowers, milo, or sugar beets) 
0 if wheat, oats, or other small grains are included 
Rowe hay Rowe * Hay 0.155 0.362 ? 
Rowcpast Rowe * Pasture 0.173 0.378 ? 
Haypast Hay * Pasture 0.094 0.292 ? 
Family 1 if landlord are parents or relative, 0 otherwise 0.394 0.489 + 
Institution 1 iflandlord is corporation or Federal, state, or tribal 0.064 0.245 -
agency, 0 otherwise 
Absent 1 if landlord is nonlocal individual unrelated to renter 0.232 0.423 ? 
Capital Proportion of farmland acres operated that is owned by 0.354 0.283 -
renter 
Farminc Dependence on net farm income as percent of 3.069 1.122 + 
household income: =l < 30% =2 30-49% 
=3 50- 79% =4 >=80% 
Age Age category ofrenter (in years) 3.772 1.20 -
= 1 < 25 =2 25- 34 =3 35-44 =4 45-54 yrs. 
=5 55- 64 =6 65- 74 = 7 75+ yrs. 
Practice 1 if selected conservation practices are used, 0 otherwise 0.444 0.497 ? 
Tillage Index of predicted soil loss by tillage practice on lease 1.724 0.658 ? 
tract 
Oral 1 if contract is an oral lease, 0 if contract is a written lease 0.589 0.492 + 
Density Population per square mile in county of leased land 29.63 74.72 -
State 1 if lease is in Nebraska, 0 if lease is in South Dakota 0.626 0.484 ? 
Percent of leased acres in: 
Irrpct Irrigated crop 25.54 39.27 -
Haypct Hay 3.24 8.96 -
Rngpct Pasture 6.71 15.79 -
Source: 1996 Cropland Leasing Survey, Nebraska and South Dakota 
"The bolded explanatory variables were used in the final logistic model reported by Allen and Leuck, 1992 
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Model Results for Croplease Decision 
A. Full Model I 
Standard Wald Pr > Odds 
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi Sq Ratio 
Intercept -0.592 0.325 3.329 0.068 
ROWC -0.209 0.182 1.312 0.252 0.812 
IRRIGATE 0.108 0.140 0.596 0.440 1.114 
HAY -1 .097 0.404 7.382 0.007 0.334 
ROWCHAY 1.229 0.440 7.811 0.005 3.419 
DENSITY -0.0001 0.00085 0.009 0.926 1.000 
ACRES -0.0001 0.00025 0.096 0.756 1.000 
INSTITUTION -0.509 0.268 3.612 0.057 0.601 
FAMILY 0.468 0.133 12.451 0.000 1.597 
AGE 0.211 0.060 12.169 0.001 1.235 
FARMINC 0.060 0.057 1.107 0.293 1.062 
CAPITAL -0.671 0.261 6.632 0.010 0.511 
N = 1071 C-index = 0.598 
-2 Log L = 1434.11 for intercept and covariates 
Chi square for covariates= 46.12 with 11 d.f. (p < 0.0001) 
Source: 1996 Nebraska/South Dakota Cropland Leasing Survey 
B. Stepwise Model I 
Standard Wald Pr > Odds 
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi Sq Ratio 
Intercept -0.4462 0.2736 2.660 0.103 
ROWC -0.1710 0.1732 0.974 0.324 0.843 
HAY -1.1240 0.4005 7.876 0.005 0.325 
ROWCHAY 1.2296 0.4379 7.883 0.005 3.420 
INSTITUTION -0.4829 0.2666 3.280 0.070 0.617 
FAMILY 0.4836 0.1319 13.433 0.000 1.622 
AGE 0.2152 0.0602 12.795 0.000 1.240 
CAPITAL -0.6648 0.2544 6.827 0.009 0.514 
N = 1071 C-index = 0.599 
-2 Log L = 1434.11 for intercept and covariates 
Chi square for covariates= 44.13 with 7 d.f. (p = 0.0001) 
Variables removed: DENSITY, ACRES, IRRIGATE, FARMINC 
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C. Stepwise Model II 
Standard Wald Pr > Odds 
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi Sq Ratio 
Intercept -1.1817 0.3065 14.869 0.0001 
ROWC -0.2802 0.1857 2.278 0.131 0.756 
HAY -0.9182 0.4183 4.818 0.028 0.399 
PASTURE -0.4805 0.1715 7.852 0.005 0.618 
ROWCHAY 1.1650 0.4521 6.639 0.010 3.206 
FAMILY 0.4512 0.1515 8.866 0.003 1.570 
ABSENT 0.4554 0.1718 7.031 0.008 1.557 
AGE 0.1727 0.0629 7.548 0.006 1.189 
CAPITAL -0.7336 0.2676 7.518 0.006 0.480 
ORAL 1.0943 0.1404 60.740 <.0001 2.987 
STATE 0.5044 0.1438 12.295 0.001 1.656 
N = 1071 C-index = 0.683 
-2 Log L = 1354.84 
Chi square for covariates= 121.95 with 10 d.f. (p < 0.0001) 
Variable removed: PRACTICE, IRRIGATE, INTITUTION, HAYPAST, TILLAGE, 
DENSITY, ACRES, ROWCPAST, F ARMINC 
D. Stepwise Model III 
Standard Wald Pr > 
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi Sq 
Intercept -1.393 0.262 28.223 <.0001 
RNGPCT -0.018 0.0043 17.224 <.0001 
FAMILY 0.463 0.152 9.347 0.002 
ABSENT 0.476 0.171 7.694 0.005 
AGE 0.168 0.062 7.268 0.007 
CAPITAL -0.670 0.267 6.277 0.012 
ORAL 1.093 0.140 60.765 <.0001 
STATE 0.504 0.139 13.180 0.0001 
N = 1071 C-index = 0.685 
-2 Log L = 1350.07 for intercept and covariates 
Chi square for covariates= 130.16 with 15 d.f. (p < 0.0001) 
Odds 
Ratio 
0.982 
1.589 
1.609 
1.183 
0.512 
2.983 
1.655 
Variables removed: PRACTICE, TILLAGE, INTITUTION, IRRPCT, DENSITY, ACRES, 
HAYPCT, FARMINC 
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